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French champagne magnate Claude Taittinger received
the subpoena while visiting the Gagosian Art Gallery in New
York City.1 Taittinger's family-owned enterprise had entered
high-profile securities litigation in Paris against American cor-
porate raider Asher Edelman.2 Taittinger lived and worked in
France, but was not personally a party to the French lawsuit.3
Undaunted, Edelman's lawyers demanded that Taittinger serve
as a nonparty witness in the dispute by returning to the South-
ern District of New York for a deposition and surrendering
documents he created and stored in France, citing a federal
statute designed to obtain discovery in the United States for
use in litigation abroad.4
Elsewhere in Manhattan, Takao Sasaki felt "ambushed."5
As a general manager at Japanese reinsurer Aioi Insurance,
Sasaki had just wrapped up unsuccessful negotiations aimed at
avoiding a lawsuit with Fortress Re, a North Carolina reinsur-
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1998,
Macalester College. My thanks to Dean E. Thomas Sullivan for his guidance,
to the editorial trio of Emily R.D. Pruisner, Andrew Pratt, and Kelly Pierce for
their invaluable advice, and to Travis for listening to me prattle on about civil
procedure. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the law firm of Lock-
ridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P. in Minneapolis for the juicy case work that
sparked my interest in the topic.
1. In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 2002).
2. For a lively background on the dispute that precipitated the French
litigation, see Dana Nigro, Champagne's Taittinger Family Battles Corporate
Raider, WINE SPECTATOR, Jan. 31, 1999, http://
www.winespectator.com/Wine/Archives/ShowArticle/0,1275,2047,00.html.
3. Edelman, 295 F.3d at 174.
4. In re Edelman, No. M19-70, 2001 WL 1877451, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
28, 2001) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2000)), vacated by 295 F.3d at 181-82.
5. In re Application for Order Quashing Deposition Subpoenas, dated
July 16, 2002, No. M8-85, 2002 WL 1870084, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2002).
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ance underwriting firm already embroiled in litigation with
some of Aioi's competitors. As the meeting ended, lawyers for
Fortress Re served a subpoena, demanding that Sasaki act as a
nonparty witness in an ongoing lawsuit in North Carolina. His
attorneys vigorously protested, claiming that Fortress Re had
"induced" Sasaki, a resident of Japan who made infrequent
trips to the United States, to attend the meeting. s
Both men moved to quash the subpoenas, arguing that as
nonparties, with few contacts in the forum state and no direct
stake in the underlying litigation, the court lacked personal ju-
risdiction over them.9 In both cases, the courts disagreed, find-
ing that the witnesses "'knew, or should have known, that by'
[traveling to] New York, [they were] 'risking exposure to per-
sonal jurisdiction in New York."" After all, the courts rea-
soned, if the state could properly exercise jurisdiction over
them as defendants," "there is no reason why service of a sub-
poena under Rule 45(b)(2), 'which is simply a discovery mecha-
nism and does not subject a person to liability, requires
more."
' 12
Taittinger and Sasaki's experiences as nonparty witnesses
highlights the uneasy relationship between nonparty discovery
and personal jurisdiction. The courts in each case make two
important assumptions: (1) that due process limits on personal
jurisdiction apply to nonparties at all, and not just to defen-
6. Id. at *1.
7. See id. at *2.
8. Id. at *3.
9. More accurately, Taittinger had the personal jurisdiction debate
thrust upon him when the Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's per-
sonal jurisdiction case law in construing 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). See Edelman,
295 F.3d at 179.
10. Application for Order, 2002 WL 1870084, at *2 (quoting First Am.
Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1998)); Edelman,
295 F.3d at 179.
11. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion) (holding that personal service of a defendant physically pre-
sent in a forum state always confers constitutionally sufficient personal juris-
diction).
12. Application for Order, 2002 WL 1870084, at *2 (quoting Edelman, 295
F.3d at 179). Fortunately for Sasaki, the court accepted his alternative argu-
ment that the subpoena ran afoul of the 100-mile limit on depositions in Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). Id. at *5. The court quashed the
subpoena on those grounds, while noting that personal jurisdiction would have
been proper for other forms of discovery. Id. at *5-7. Taittinger was not so
lucky, as the Second Circuit vacated the district court's order quashing the
subpoena and remanded all other challenges. Edelman, 295 F.3d at 180-81.
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dants;13 and (2) that the Supreme Court's approach to personal
jurisdiction over defendants is workable for nonparty discov-
ery.14 As the volume and complexity of international litigation
in American courts grow, 5 such assumptions will come under
sharp scrutiny, as parties increasingly seek testimony and
documents from distant nonparty witnesses like Taittinger and
Sasaki.
This Note tests both assumptions, arguing that courts' per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis must reflect the fact that nonparties
have "no dog in the fight. " 16 Part I recounts the development of
the law of nonparty discovery and personal jurisdiction in the
United States. Part II considers whether due process grants
nonparties a constitutional right to avoid discovery for lack of
personal jurisdiction and, if so, how courts should give effect to
that right. The Note concludes that due process indeed imposes
a personal jurisdiction limit on nonparty discovery, and that
the "minimum contacts" test offers the best framework for
evaluating such claims. It also proposes that courts revisit four
aspects of the minimum contacts analysis before considering
challenges by nonparty witnesses: specific jurisdiction, unilat-
eral activity, transient jurisdiction, and the "fair play and sub-
stantial justice"7 prong.
I. A DOG'S AGE
Any discussion of the intersection between nonparty dis-
covery and personal jurisdiction must begin with a review of
each subject. Part I lays this groundwork, and then describes
federal and state court responses in cases where nonparty wit-
nesses have objected to the personal jurisdiction of the court.
First, it provides an overview of nonparty civil discovery, both
at common law and under modern discovery regimes. Second, it
traces the development of the minimum contacts analysis, from
13. See Application for Order, 2002 WL 1870084, at *2.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., John H. Robinson, The Extraterritorial Application of Ameri-
can Law: Preliminary Reflections, 27 J.C. & U.L. 187, 203 (2000); Lucinda A.
Low, Virtually All Areas of Law Profession Face Globalization, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 5, 1996, at C9.
16. To have "no dog in the fight" or "no dog in the hunt" means to have no
stake or interest in a conflict. See, e.g., Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d
708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998).
17. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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International Shoe Co. v. Washington18 to the Court's lone con-
sideration of personal jurisdiction over nondefendants in Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. 9 Third, it summarizes recent fed-
eral and state court decisions evaluating personal jurisdiction
for nonparty subpoenas. Part I reveals that courts, taking their
cue from the disparate legal underpinnings of nonparty discov-
ery and personal jurisdiction, have adopted a haphazard range
of approaches when the two bodies of law collide.
A. DOGGING THE DOGLESS: NONPARTY CIVIL DISCOVERY
IN AMERICAN COURTS
1. Where Certainty Wanteth: Nonparty Discovery
at Common Law
Civil discovery in American courts originated in English
Chancery courts as the bill of discovery."° Initially designed to
facilitate pretrial discovery in equity suits, 2 1 the bill of discov-
ery gradually made its way into actions at law.2 ' Bills of discov-
ery enabled any party to bring an action against a party or
nonparty demanding testimony, documents, and other tangible
things to assist in developing a case or defense. 3 While often
styled as independent actions, bills of discovery were treated
not as separate injunctive actions but as an extension of the in-
herent power of equity courts. 4 The Supreme Court formally
endorsed the device in 1933,25 but the bill of discovery was dis-
18. Id.
19. 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
20. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
While the subpoena ad testificandum gave courts at law a mechanism to se-
cure the attendance of witnesses at trial, the device played no role in pretrial
discovery. Cohn Tapper, Discovery in Modern Times: A Voyage Around the
Common Law World, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 217, 220 (1991).
21. Discovery in Chancery courts began "as early as the reign of Henry
VI," who proclaimed that "'[wihere certainty wanteth the common law faileth,
but yet help is to be found in Chancery for it.'" 1 GEORGE SPENCE, THE
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 678 (1846) (quoting
Statute of 36 Hen. VI 26) (alteration in original).
22. GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 12-13 (1932).
23. See Sarah N. Welling, Discovery of Nonparties' Tangible Things Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 110, 131-32
(1983).
24. See Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333, 337 (Conn. 1994).
25. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689,
693 (1933) (stating that because "[a]t times, cases will not be proved, or will be
proved clumsily or wastefully, if a litigant is not permitted to gather his evi-
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placed by the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a few years
later.
Several common law limitations on the bill of discovery
weakened its effectiveness with respect to nonparties. As a
general rule, courts simply lacked the power to issue a bill of
discovery against a nonparty.27 While courts occasionally carved
out exceptions, a bill of discovery would never lie against a
mere witness. Under this restriction, courts could not order
equitable discovery against a nonparty who had no interest in
the underlying dispute,29 although courts rarely defined the
requisite interest with much precision. 0 Also, the common law
fixation with preventing "fishing expeditions"3" translated into
a requirement that bills of discovery state with specificity the
materials requested 32-frequently a tall order for discovery
dence in advance ... a bill in equity is maintainable to give him what he
needs" as long as "this necessity is made out with reasonable certainty").
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note on subdivision (a) (1937);
Welling, supra note 23, at 132 n.117.
27. See 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1862, at 631-32 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1976).
28. E.g., Dehne v. Hillman Inv. Co., 110 F.2d 456, 458 (3d Cir. 1940) ("At
common law a bill of discovery was demurrable if it lay against a defendant
who was a mere witness."); Post v. Toledo, Cincinnati & St. Louis R.R., 11
N.E. 540, 547 (Mass. 1887) ("It is clear that courts do not compel discovery
from persons who sustain no other relation to the contemplated litigation, or
to the subject of the suit, than that of witnesses."); Arcell v. Ashland Chem.
Co., 378 A.2d 53, 71 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) ("It is clear that a 'mere
witness' cannot be named a defendant in an action for discovery."); 1 EDWARD
BRAY, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY 42 (Legal Books 1985)
(1885) ("A mere witness cannot be made a party to an action however essential
the discovery which he could give might be to the plaintiff.").
29. See 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 199 (4th ed. 1918) (stat-
ing that courts require a nonparty to have "an interest in the subject-matter of
the controversy in aid of which the discovery is asked").
30. See Arcell, 378 A.2d at 71; Welling, supra note 23, at 135 n.133 (specu-
lating that the "mere witness" rule "reflects a notion that nonparties have a
right not to be inconvenienced and drawn into others' litigation unless they
have some interest in it"). Some authorities suggest that, historically, equity
courts limited discovery to persons having "such an interest in the action that
they would be directly affected by the decree," a rule "tantamount to saying
that discovery could not be had from witnesses or from any other third persons
not parties." RAGLAND, supra note 22, at 46-47.
31. See Post, 11 N.E. at 547 (noting that "a bill of discovery cannot be used
to enable a plaintiff to fish for information of any causes of action... against
other persons than the defendant"). But see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
507 (1947) ("No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's
case.").
32. Welling, supra note 23, at 133.
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from nonparties with no interest in the case. As a result, his-
torically, courts rarely forced nonparties" to submit to discovery
in civil disputes.33
2. Every Man's Evidence: Nonparty Discovery Today
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supplanted equitable
bills of discovery in the federal courts in 1937, and as state
courts adopted similar discovery regimes, the bill of discovery
fell into disuse.34 While courts today occasionally assert that the
public has a "right to every man's evidence,"35 that right is far
from absolute.
Even under greatly liberalized modern discovery rules,
nonparties enjoy considerable protection from burdensome dis-
covery requests. Rule 45, for example, places an express 100-
mile territorial limit on subpoenas that require a nonparty to
give a deposition in person.36 Courts may refuse discovery re-
quests aimed at nonparties in cases where the same testimony
or documents could instead be obtained from a party to the ac-
tion.37 Under some circumstances, nonparties may file an im-
mediate appeal of a discovery order on the theory that "the
third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceed-
ing to risk contempt by refusing compliance."38 A few courts
even impose a heightened relevancy requirement for nonparty
discovery requests.39
33. This Note focuses on the subpoena power of courts in civil actions. It
does not address the scope of the subpoena power in criminal cases, where a
range of factors, including the constitutional right to confront witnesses, may
alter the constitutional standard.
34. Welling, supra note 23, at 132 n.117. But see Wolfe v. Mass. Port
Auth., 319 N.E.2d 423, 424 (Mass. 1974) (stating that revised civil discovery
rules do not supplant, but merely supplement, equitable bills of discovery un-
der Massachusetts law).
35. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 & n.8 (1996) (acknowledging pub-
lic's right to "every man's evidence" but upholding psychotherapist's testimo-
nial privilege); see also Anker v. G.D. Searle & Co., 126 F.R.D. 515, 519
(M.D.N.C. 1989) (acknowledging that the public's right to evidence cannot in-
fringe on "constitutional, statutory or common law privileges").
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). This 100-mile limit, by its own terms,
extends only to "travel," and thus has no effect on requests for documents or
tangible things under Rule 34. See id.
37. See, e.g., Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 998 F.2d 975, 978 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (requiring the plaintiff to "seek discovery from its party opponent
before burdening the nonparty" with requests for settlement documents).
38. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11
(1992).
39. E.g. Royal Surplus Lines Ins. v. Sofamor Danek Group, 190 F.R.D.
973
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Most importantly, federal and state discovery rules protect
nonparties by almost universally requiring the court to balance
the need for requested discovery against the expense of compli-
ance,40 and empowering courts to modify or quash subpoenas
that impose an undue burden.4 Courts usually give special so-
licitude to nonparties in this calculation,42 recognizing that
nonparty witnesses have "no dog in that fight."41 Quite apart
from questions of personal jurisdiction, then, nonparties enjoy
considerable protection from excessive discovery.
B. TOP DOG: THE EMERGENCE OF MINIMUM CONTACTS
The United States Supreme Court inaugurated the modern
formula for evaluating personal jurisdiction in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,44 holding that due process requires a
defendant to "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'' Subse-
quent cases have refined and shaped the minimum contacts
analysis.46 The Supreme Court curtailed the scope of the per-
sonal jurisdiction requirement by rejecting its extension to ab-
sent class-action plaintiffs in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.4"
463, 467 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). But see 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2459, at 46 (3d ed. 1995) (not-
ing that "there is no basis for this distinction in the rule's language").
40. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2).
41. See FED. R. CIv. P. 45(c)(B)(iv).
42. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d
774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the rules "afford nonparties special pro-
tection against the time and expense of complying with subpoenas"); Monarch
Healthcare v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(describing California discovery procedures as "generally less onerous for
strangers to the litigation"); Allstate Ins. v. Boecher, 705 So. 2d 106, 107 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("[Tlhe nature of protection for a party from relevant dis-
covery requests is qualitatively different from that afforded to someone who is
merely a witness.").
43. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting
that while parties must expect invasive discovery in modern litigation, "[n]on-
parties have a different set of expectations" and "concern for the unwanted
burden thrust upon non-parties is a factor entitled to special weight in evalu-
ating the balance of competing needs").
44. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
45. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
46. See Diane S. Kaplan, Paddling Up the Wrong Stream: Why the Stream
of Commerce Theory Is Not Part of the Minimum Contacts Doctrine, 55
BAYLOR L. REV. 503, 515-17 (2003).
47. 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
[Vol 88:968
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Four other developments have particular relevance to nonparty
discovery: (1) the widespread recognition of general and specific
jurisdiction; 8 (2) the rejection of jurisdiction based on the uni-
lateral activity of third parties;49 (3) the approval of transient
jurisdiction based on physical presence in the forum state;50 and
(4) the emergence of a multifactor reasonableness inquiry sepa-
rate from the aggregation of contacts.51
1. Phillips Petroleum and the Scope of the Personal
Jurisdiction Requirement
In the nearly sixty years since International Shoe, the Su-
preme Court has never applied the minimum contacts analysis
to a nonparty.53 Only once, in Phillips Petroleum, has it consid-
ered applying the test to a nondefendant.55 The case involved a
defendant's challenge to the Kansas court's personal jurisdic-
tion over certain non-named class-action plaintiffs, joined
automatically through a class "opt out" notice, who lacked any
pre-litigation contacts with the state. 7 Despite the fact that the
minimum contacts analysis was designed to protect defendants
from litigation in a distant forum," the Court acknowledged
that "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment does protect 'persons,' not
48. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 nn.8-9 (1984).
49. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
50. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990).
51. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-15
(1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-94
(1980).
52. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
53. The Court has hinted, however, that due process requires a court to
have personal jurisdiction over the party before issuing discovery orders. See
United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487
U.S. 72, 76 (1988) (holding that "the subpoena power of a court cannot be more
extensive than its jurisdiction," but passing only on a challenge to subject mat-
ter jurisdiction); Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (affirming jurisdiction over a defendant based on con-
structive consent, where the court deemed personal jurisdiction admitted as a
sanction for discovery abuses, and noting that "[t]he validity of an order of a
federal court depends upon that court's having jurisdiction over both the sub-
ject matter and the parties").
54. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
55. 472 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1985).
56. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring federal courts, in a class-
action, to "exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion").
57. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 806.
58. Id. at 807.
975
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'defendants,'" meaning that absent plaintiffs deserve due proc-
ess protection when a distant state attempts to adjudicate their
claims.59 The Court upheld Kansas's jurisdiction, however, rea-
soning that "[t]he burdens placed by a State upon an absent
class-action plaintiff are not of the same order of magnitude as
those it places upon an absent defendant." ° Emphasizing that
a range of class-action devices protects the rights of absent
plaintiff class members,6' the Court held that Kansas could
properly exercise jurisdiction even though the same contacts
would not support jurisdiction over a defendant.62 It adopted in-
stead a requirement for simple procedural due process, requir-
ing only notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the right to opt
out of inclusion in the class. 3
Phillips Petroleum makes two valuable contributions to a
discussion of personal jurisdiction in nonparty discovery. First,
it confirms the obvious: the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee due process to persons, not parties.64 This language
suggests some constitutional limit on courts' jurisdiction over
nonparties, despite the Court's longstanding focus on defen-
dants. Second, Phillips Petroleum reveals the Court's approach
when determining whether personal jurisdiction protections
apply to classes of persons other than defendants. 65 If the bur-
dens imposed by the court are "of the same order or magni-
59. Id. at 811.
60. Id. at 808. The Court cited a number of burdens facing out-of-state
defendants not applicable to class-action plaintiffs: the "full powers of the
forum State to render judgment against it," the need to "hire counsel and
travel to the forum to defend itself," the risk of default judgment, the prospect
of "extended and often costly discovery," and the cost of a judgment on the
merits of the suit. Id. Broadly, the Court noted that "[ulnlike a defendant in a
normal civil suit, an absent class-action plaintiff is not required to do
anything," but "may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content
in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection." Id. at 810.
61. Id. at 810-11.
62. Id. at 811.
63. Id. at 811-12.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.. . ."); id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... ").
65. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 811-12. The Supreme Court has
since confirmed that absent class-action plaintiffs "could not invoke the same
due process limits on personal jurisdiction that out-of-state defendants had
under International Shoe" but could raise procedural due process concerns.
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 847-48 (1999).
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tude"66 as those imposed on out-of-state defendants, due process
imposes a corresponding level of protection.
2. Specific and General Jurisdiction
Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman first
proposed the terms "general jurisdiction" and "specific jurisdic-
tion" to categorize courts' treatment of personal jurisdiction
over out-of-state defendants.67 The Supreme Court adopted
their formulation in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A.
v. Hall,8 noting that a state exercises specific jurisdiction in
suits "arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with
the forum," and exercises general jurisdiction in suits "not aris-
ing out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the fo-
,,69
rum. Specific jurisdiction makes possible the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction based on a limited set of contacts, even a
defendant's single act, if sufficiently related to the underlying
lawsuit.7 0 General jurisdiction, in contrast, requires such "con-
tinuous and systematic" contacts that the forum could assert
• 71
jurisdiction over the defendant in any action.
Notably, the Supreme Court has endorsed specific jurisdic-
tion only over defendants;" it has never invoked specific juris-
diction in evaluating plaintiff personal jurisdiction 73 or while
evaluating a subpoena or other discovery motion distinct from
the underlying suit.
3. Unilateral Activity
In one of its earliest elaborations on the minimum contacts
analysis, the Court in Hanson v. Denkla74 held that "[t]he uni-
lateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
66. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 808.
67. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
68. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
69. Id. at 414 nn.8-9. These concepts subsequently "have become the
touchstones of contemporary personal jurisdiction analysis." Mary Twitchell,
The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 611 (1988).
70. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 n.18 (1985).
71. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16.
72. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619, 1620 (2001).
73. The Court had an opportunity in Phillips Petroleum, but declined to
apply a minimum contacts analysis for absent class-action plaintiffs. See supra
notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
74. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of con-
tact with the forum State."75 Subsequent decisions have rein-
forced that the Court will not look to the unilateral conduct of
nondefendants in evaluating personal jurisdiction over defen-
dants."6 This principle reflects two concerns. First, unilateral
acts by plaintiffs or third parties do not fit the Court's quid pro
quo rationale: "it is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."77 Second, uni-
lateral acts by plaintiffs or third parties do not provide ade-
quate notice to a defendant that it may face a lawsuit in the fo-
rum. This matters because an important function of the Due
Process Clause is to "give[] a degree of predictability to the le-
gal system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary contact with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."78 In
Kulko v. Superior Court79 for example, the Supreme Court held
that California lacked personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
father in an action for child support, where the defendant's only
relevant contact with the state was "consenting" to the children
living with their mother after she moved there from New
York.80
4. Transient Jurisdiction Based on Physical Presence
In another personal jurisdiction milestone, the Court in
Burnham v. Superior Court8' reached the deceptively straight-
forward 82 holding that a state may assert personal jurisdiction,
75. Id. at 253.
76. See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-17 (finding that the plaintiffs
payments, drawn from a nonparty bank in Texas, did not support Texas's ju-
risdiction over the defendant Columbian corporation); World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (finding that the plaintiffs
unilateral act of driving a car to Oklahoma after its sale in New York did not
support Oklahoma's jurisdiction over the regional auto distributor and dealer-
ship); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93-96 (1978) (finding that a hus-
band's consent to his estranged wife's move to California to raise their chil-
dren did not support California's jurisdiction over the husband in a child
support action).
77. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
78. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
79. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
80. Id. at 87-88, 94.
81. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
82. See Robert Taylor-Manning, Note, An Easy Case Makes Bad Law-
978 [Vol 88:968
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consistent with due process, over any defendant physically pre-
sent and personally served within its borders ("transient" or
"tag" jurisdiction).8' While all nine Justices concurred in the re-
sult, the various Burnham opinions announce a tangle of com-
peting rationales.8 4 Writing for the four-vote plurality, Justice
Scalia proposed that personal service within state boundaries
single-handedly satisfied due process because the practice stood
"[a]mong the most firmly established principles of personal ju-
risdiction in American tradition."85 Writing a four-vote concur-
rence, Justice Brennan rejected the suggestion that "all tradi-
tional rules of jurisdiction are, ipso facto, forever
constitutional." 6 He agreed that physical presence necessarily
satisfied due process, but for different reasons. First, Justice
Brennan found the pedigree of the rule, while not dispositive,
relevant to the analysis in that a time-honored rule provides
visitors to a forum state with ample notice that they may be
subject to suit." Second, he reasoned that physical presence
necessarily implies some degree of purposeful availment of
various benefits of the forum state.8 8 Third, he noted that
physical presence in the forum suggests that defending the suit
would involve only slight inconvenience, because the defendant
had already visited at least once.89 Separately, Justice White
expressed concern that without a bright-line rule, courts would
face "endless, fact-specific litigation" in personal service cases.9O
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and staying above the fray,
vaguely endorsed all three opinions,"1 leaving the precise ra-
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 66 WASH. L. REV. 623, 629-30
(1991) (criticizing Burnham for "fail[ing] to resolve the underlying historical,
legal, and equitable issues involved").
83. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
84. See id. at 628 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); id (White, J., concurring);
id. at 640 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J. plurality opinion). For Justice Scalia, a long and
continuing tradition of personal jurisdiction based on physical presence settled
the matter, and "the crucial time" was "1868, when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was adopted." Id. at 611 (Scalia, J. plurality opinion).
86. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 637-39 (Brennan, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 637-38 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing police, fire, and emer-
gency services, along with the reciprocal promise of acces to the forum state's
courts as guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as "contacts"
that justify jurisdiction over defendants physically present in the forum state).
89. Id. at 638 (Brennan, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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tionale of Burnham hopelessly unclear.
5. Fair Play and Substantial Justice for Defendants
A final relevant development in the minimum contacts
framework came in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,9'
where the Court articulated a multifactor reasonableness in-
quiry to evaluate the "fair play and substantial justice" prong of
the test:
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding
that the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern,
will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant fac-
tors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dis-
pute... the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief.., the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies ... and the shared interest
of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.93
This balancing test may reduce the degree of contact otherwise
required between a defendant and the forum,94 and turns in
large part on the facts of each case.9"
The forum's interest in resolving the dispute goes to a
state's desire to provide an "effective means of redress for its
residents,"96 and may strongly support the reasonableness of
jurisdiction when a resident plaintiff seeks relief for injury
caused within the state's borders.97 On the other hand, where a
nonresident brings the suit or where the injury occurred out-of-
state, the forum's lack of interest cuts against the reasonable-
ness of jurisdiction.98 Among the few points of agreement for
the Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court99 was
that California's assertion of jurisdiction over a Japanese com-
ponent manufacturer offended traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice under the multifactor reasonableness
test.'0 0 The Court held that "[t]he unique burdens placed upon
one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should
have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of
92. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
93. Id. at 292.
94. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
95. Id. at 486 n.29.
96. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
97. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482-83.
98. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.
99. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
100. Id. at 114 (O'Connor, J., writing for eight Justices).
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stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national
borders."' The Court's use of "foreign" to describe the Ameri-
can legal system is something of a double entendre, as the
Court emphasized that the burden on the defendant stemmed
"not only [from] travers[ing] the distance" 10 2 between Japan and
California, but more qualitatively from being forced to "submit
its dispute ... to a foreign nation's judicial system."0 3
These and other developments in the minimum contacts
framework have resulted in a workable jurisprudence of per-
sonal jurisdiction over defendants in American courts.' 4 As the
next section indicates, however, courts have struggled to apply
the same principles of personal jurisdiction to nonparty discov-
ery.
C. DOG AND PONY SHOW: COMPETING APPROACHES TO
PERSONAL JURISDICTION FOR NONPARTY WITNESSES
A survey of federal and state case law evaluating personal
jurisdiction for nonparty discovery reveals haphazard, often
competing approaches. Courts and authorities disagree, from
the outset, about whether due process imposes a limit on per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonparty witnesses at all. When they do
recognize such a requirement, they disagree about the proper
method of analysis, typically adopting some opaque version of a
minimum contacts test. They have produced particularly un-
even results when attempting to import concepts designed for
defendants, including specific jurisdiction, unilateral activity,
transient jurisdiction, and the "fair play and substantial jus-
tice" reasonableness test.
1. Minimum Contacts with Minimum Explanation
The majority of federal courts to consider the question ac-
knowledge some elementary, if imprecise, constitutional limit
on personal jurisdiction over nonparty witnesses.' Where they
101. Id. at 114.
102. Id. at 113.
103. Id. But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d
560, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1996) (considering only inconvenience based on distance
in assessing the "[blurden on the [diefendant").
104. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 633 n.7 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) ("Our experience with this approach demonstrates that it
is well within our competence to employ.").
105. A number of cases have held that due process imposes a limit on per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonparty witnesses. See, e.g., First Am. Corp. v. Price
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:968
have reached the question, federal courts usually apply some
species of minimum contacts test.1 Their decisions, however,
typically forego any serious discussion of the applicable per-
sonal jurisdiction standard for nonparty witnesses.
Many state courts, on the other hand, hold that limits on
personal jurisdiction do not extend to nonparty witnesses. The
Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that service of a sub-
poena on a nonparty witness physically present in the district satisfies due
process); In re Application to Enforce Admin. Subpoenas Duces Tecum of SEC
v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1996) (requiring that the Bahamian
nonparty subject to an administrative agency subpoena possess minimum con-
tacts with the United States); Innomed Techs., Inc. v. Worldwide Med. Techs.,
Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (denying motion "to compel
immediate and significant discovery from non-parties over whom this Court
has determined that it has no personal jurisdiction"); In re Application for Or-
der Quashing Deposition Subpoenas, dated July 16, 2002, No. M8-85, 2002
WL 1870084, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2002) (finding due process satisfied
based on personal service of the subpoena within the district); In re Jee, 104
B.R. 289, 293 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (acknowledging the need for personal
jurisdiction over nonparty witnesses, and finding both general and specific ju-
risdiction available); Ghandi v. Police Dep't, 74 F.R.D. 115, 121 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (upholding nonparty document subpoena of an FBI field office based on
minimum contacts); Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores,
Inc., 45 F.R.D. 515, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (quashing document subpoena based
on complete lack of contacts with the forum); see also 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 108.125 (3d ed. 2003) (stating that "[a]
nonparty witness cannot be compelled to testify at a trial, hearing, or deposi-
tion unless the witness is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court," but
citing no authority for this proposition).
Other cases appear to recognize such a limit in dicta. See, e.g., In re
Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 337, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that in Rule 45
discovery transfer motions "a transferee court ... would often lack personal
jurisdiction over the nonparty"); In re United States Catholic Conference, 824
F.2d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., United States
Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988)
(holding that nonparty witnesses have standing to appeal civil contempt sanc-
tions for any reason that "concerns the witness personally," including "the dis-
trict court's personal jurisdiction over the witness"); Ariel v. Jones, 693 F.2d
1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 1982) (quashing a subpoena based in part on the non-
party witness's "minimal contacts ... with the southern district of Florida");
FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1321
n.119 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (assuming that "just as a court may not validly exert its
adjudicative authority over a defendant lacking 'minimum contacts' with the
forum . . . the FTC is subject to some limitations on its personal jurisdiction-
set by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution"); Ion Beam Applications,
S.A. v. Titan Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561-62 (E.D. Va. 2000) (noting on a
motion to transfer venue that "[tihis Court has no greater subpoena power
over out-of-state witnesses than does the Southern District of California").
106. See, e.g., Knowles, 87 F.3d at 418; Ariel, 693 F.2d at 1060-61; Jee, 104
B.R. at 293; Ghandi, 74 F.R.D. at 121; Elder-Beerman Stores, 45 F.R.D. at 516;
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2454.
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Oklahoma Court of Appeals, for example, has expressly con-
fined the minimum contacts analysis to parties, rendering In-. 107
ternational Shoe and its progeny "inapplicable" to discovery.
Other states have reached the same result, reasoning that
"[tihe underlying concepts of personal jurisdiction and sub-
poena power are entirely different."'08
That federal courts would turn to minimum contacts, even
for nonparties, comes as no great surprise. When a federal
court invokes diversity jurisdiction, it necessarily hears cross-
border disputes that may implicate witnesses and documents
outside the state where it resides."0 Many federal question
cases involve federal statutes with nationwide service-of-
process or venue provisions that make possible far-flung
sources of discoverable information.1 Importing the minimum
contacts analysis to nonparty discovery extends the reach of the
subpoena beyond that provided by a traditional territorial ap-
proach,"' making it useful to facilitate the breadth of nonparty
discovery required in federal cases. Moreover, since Interna-
tional Shoe, the minimum contacts test has become the most
widely known (and widely litigated) method for evaluating due
.... 112
process limits on personal jurisdiction.
Remarkably, despite declining to require minimum con-
tacts for nonparty witnesses, most state courts provide out-of-
107. Craft v. Chopra, 907 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995).
108. In re Nat'l Contract Poultry Growers' Ass'n, 771 So. 2d 466, 469 (Ala.
2000). The Alabama Supreme Court's reasoning is illustrative:
Personal jurisdiction is based on conduct that subjects the nonresi-
dent to the power of the Alabama courts to adjudicate its rights and
obligations in a legal dispute.... By contrast, the subpoena power of
an Alabama court over an individual or a corporation that is not a
party to a lawsuit is based on the power and authority of the court to
compel the attendance of a person at a deposition or the production of
documents by a person or entity.
Id.; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. OKC L.P., 634 So. 2d 1186, 1187-88 (La.
1994) (same)..
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2000) (granting federal courts jurisdiction
over controversies between "citizens of different States").
110. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2000) (authorizing national service of
process for actions brought under Employee Retirement Income Security Act);
15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000) (making venue proper in private enforcement antitrust
actions in any district in the United States where the defendant "may be found
or transacts business").
111. See Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Ves-
tige, 74 MiNN. L. REV. 37, 67 (1989).
112. See Twitchell, supra note 69, at 611.
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state nonparties greater insulation from discovery than do fed-
eral courts."3 This reflects the traditional concept of states as
sovereign powers, exercising plenary jurisdiction within their
territories but largely powerless beyond state lines."4 Most
states retain strict limits on the reach of the subpoena power,
holding that subpoena service cannot reach nonparties found
outside the state."
5
Courts at the federal and state level disagree, then, over
fundamental questions about the applicability of the personal
jurisdiction requirement to nonparty witnesses and the proper
framework for analysis. Even where courts have agreed on
some species of minimum contacts test, however, the following
sections reveal that the uncritical adoption of case law designed
for defendants has produced mixed results.
2. Specific Jurisdiction, Applied Generally
A few federal courts have invoked specific jurisdiction in
enforcing subpoenas against an out-of-state nonparty. The most
influential decision, from the Tenth Circuit, upheld document
subpoenas issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
against the former president of two Bahamian corporations
suspected of bribing American brokers."' The court noted that
the witness's contacts with the United States related directly to
his activity as president of the corporations under investiga-
113. See Welling, supra note 23, at 146-47 (citing Texas and New York
provisions demanding higher standards of proof for nonparty discovery re-
quests, under provisions analogous to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
114. Cf FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d
1300, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (analyzing subpoena power of federal administra-
tive agency under principles of international law).
115. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Contract Poultry Growers' Ass'n, 771 So. 2d 466,
469 (Ala. 2000); Armstrong v. Hooker, 661 P.2d 208 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); In re
Special Investigation No. 219, 445 A.2d 1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Estate
of Mirsky, 546 N.Y.S.2d 951, 953 (N.Y. Sur. 1989); MOORE ET AL., supra note
105, § 108.125. For a thorough review of the territorial reach of state courts'
subpoena power, see Wasserman, supra note 111, at 67-75, concluding that
while "every state has adopted a long-arm statute authorizing assertions of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants,... not a single state has
adopted a statute authorizing assertions of extraterritorial subpoena power
over nonparty witnesses." States are slowly relaxing those restrictions, how-
ever, as state courts and administrative agencies increasingly adjudicate na-
tional and international disputes. See Silverman v. Berkson, 661 A.2d 1266,
1275 (N.J. 1995).
116. In re Application to Enforce Admin. Supboenas Duces Tecum of SEC
v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 414-15 (10th Cir. 1996).
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tion, and thus gave rise to specific jurisdiction. 7 Other federal
courts have taken a more aggressive approach, suggesting that
any relationship between a discovery request and the underly-
ing litigation provides specific jurisdiction over a nonparty.18
3. Unilateral Activity, Still Active
Several courts have borrowed portions of the unilateral ac-
tivity rule to evaluate personal jurisdiction over nonparty wit-
nesses. In Silverman v. Berkson,"9 the New Jersey Supreme
Court heard a challenge to personal jurisdiction by a nonparty
named in a state administrative agency subpoena. 12 Despite
holding that International Shoe did not "inevitably" control the
territorial reach of the subpoena power,' 2 1 the court adopted a
"purposeful availment" rule as its due process standard 22 and
held that the nonparty had purposefully availed itself of the
benefits and protections of doing business in New Jersey by
"entering regulated securities markets in the forum state."22
Similar concerns about unilateral activity have influenced
other courts.
24
117. Id. at 418. As the target of a formal SEC investigation, Knowles may
not be typical of the nonparties discussed in this Note. Cf Compagnie De
Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1310-11 (describing the recipient
of a subpoena, "one of several targets of an FTC investigation which remains
in a preliminary phase," as neither "an accused in a criminal trial nor.., a
defendant in a civil trial" but as "merely a third-party witness on notice").
Still, the Tenth Circuit's reliance on specific jurisdiction to support personal
jurisdiction in a discovery request, based on the contents of the anticipated
testimony and documents, has obvious implications for all nonparties holding
"books, documents or tangible things" relevant to distant litigation. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C).
118. See, e.g., In re Jee, 104 B.R. 289, 293-94 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (ac-
knowledging that "[tihe initial query is whether this court has jurisdiction
over [nonparty] KEB" and finding specific jurisdiction because "the documents
requested ... arise out of and are related to the litigation"); cf FTC v. Produc-
tive Mktg., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1102-03 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (upholding
jurisdiction over nonparty subject to receivership because "the instant matter
clearly relates to [the nonparty's] forum-related activities"; absent the non-
party's relationship with the defendants, it would not have held any of the de-
fendant's assets).
119. 661 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1995).
120. Id. at 1267.
121. Id. at 1272.
122. Id. at 1273 ("We agree that absent 'purposeful availment,' the jurisdic-
tion to proscribe conduct in another forum would not suffice to confer jurisdic-
tion to enforce a civil investigative demand in the territory of another state."),
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc.,
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4. Transient Jurisdiction, Here to Stay
A striking line of Second Circuit cases has imported tran-
sient jurisdiction per Burnham v. Superior Court 125 as the con-
trolling standard for nonparty witnesses. In First American
Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP,126 the court enforced a document
subpoena against a partnership from the United Kingdom,
served on one of the partners while physically present in New
York on a business trip.1 7 The court brushed aside protests
that the partnership was a foreign entity and a nonparty to the
suit,12 8 and declined a lengthy analysis of the Burnham deci-
sion, reasoning simply that "a person who is subjected to liabil-
ity by service of process far from home may have better cause to
complain of an outrage to fair play than one similarly situated
who is merely called upon to supply documents or testimony."
129
While the court in First American may have stopped short of
articulating a per se rule that personal service of a subpoena
within state lines comports with due process, 3 ° the courts that
ruled on the Taittinger and Sasaki subpoenas unquestionably
interpreted the decision that way.'3 ' The line of cases now
stands for the proposition that because the subpoena power is
"simply a discovery mechanism" and cannot impose liability,
nonparty witnesses deserve some lesser degree of protection
from the personal jurisdiction of distant courts than defendants
receive. 32
45 F.R.D. 515, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (quashing a subpoena for lack of personal
jurisdiction where the parties selected the forum themselves, solely because it
would "suit the convenience of counsel," without regard for the burden on the
nonparty witness); Ramirez v. Lagunes, 794 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. App. 1990)
(holding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction for a bill of discovery based
"merely [on] locating monies in a Texas bank account").
125. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
126. 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998).
127. Id. at 20.
128. See id. (seeing "no reason for.., per se distinctions" between parties
and nonparties).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 20-21 (commenting only briefly on the question of personal
jurisdiction over a nonparty foreign entity, and relying on the fact that the
partner served "was in New York working on a prolonged assignment for an
affiliated partnership, having been seconded to do so" by his partnership).
131. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (summarizing the courts'
holdings that personal jurisdiction was proper, despite the fact that the wit-
nesses' transient visit to New York had virtually no relationship to the re-
quested discovery or the underlying lawsuit).
132. In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir. 2002). These decisions mark
something of a departure for the Second Circuit. The late Judge Mansfield,
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5. Fair Play Free-for-All
No court has expressly applied the multifactor reasonable-
ness test that makes up the "fair play and substantial justice"
prong of the minimum contacts test when evaluating a personal
jurisdiction challenge by a nonparty witness. Yet a few widely
scattered courts have, informally and perhaps unknowingly,
borrowed and modified elements from the test to fit the context
of nonparty discovery.
First, in a close parallel to the "fair play and substantial
justice" test's inquiry into the burden on the defendant, 133 sev-
eral courts have considered the burden on the nonparty wit-
ness. Where the facts suggest an unusually slight burden on an
out-of-state nonparty, courts have shown greater willingness to
extend the territorial reach of the subpoena power. TM Con-
versely, where the facts suggest an unusually heavy burden,
courts have shown greater restraint."' Courts disagree, how-
ever, over whether nonparty status, standing alone, matters to
the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction as a component of
the burden on the witness.
13 6
Second, in a rough approximation of the inquiry into the
interests of the plaintiff, the forum state, and the interstate ju-
dicial system,37 several courts have considered the interests of
the parties, the forum state, and the system of justice as a
whole when evaluating personal jurisdiction for a nonparty
witness. For example, at least one court has refused personal
then a district judge in the Southern District of New York, had proposed dec-
ades earlier that "a different (and presumably stricter) [personal jurisdiction]
standard might apply to non-party subpoenas." Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v.
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 515, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
133. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
134. See Ghandi v. Police Dep't, 74 F.R.D. 115, 121-22 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(noting that the FBI, named as a nonparty witness, had a large field office in
the forum with adequate personnel engaged in a "wide scope of... activity");
Silverman v. Berkson, 661 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. 1995) (noting the many low-
cost methods of transportation a New York firm could use to respond to a sub-
poena issued across the bay in New Jersey).
135. See, e.g., Elder-Beerman Stores, 45 F.R.D. at 518 (taking into account
the fact that the nonparty had limited resources available in the forum, and
noting that compliance with the subpoena would require "bring[ing] volumi-
nous documents and key personnel from Georgia to New York").
136. Compare id. at 516 (presuming that a stricter personal jurisdiction
standard exists for nonparty witnesses than for defendants) with First Am.
Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1998) (seeing "no rea-
son for such per se distinctions").
137. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction where the forum state, chosen for the convenience
of the parties, needlessly increased the cost of compliance.3 8
Another has considered both the importance and uniqueness of
the requested information'39 and any duty owed by the witness
to assist in the truth-seeking function of discovery. 140 While not
consistently applied, and certainly not couched in terms of the
multifactor test proposed by the Supreme Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen, 4' consideration of these factors suggests that
courts can weigh various equitable factors when deciding on
the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction in nonparty discov-
ery as well.
II. OLD DOG, NEW TRICKS
Against this backdrop, Part II poses two questions: first,
whether due process shields nonparties from discovery where a
court lacks personal jurisdiction; and second, if so, whether
courts should apply the same minimum contacts analysis to
nonparties that they apply to defendants. This section consid-
ers alternatives to the minimum contacts test, as well as modi-
fications that might make the analysis more workable in re-
solving personal jurisdiction challenges by nonparty witnesses.
Part II concludes that due process indeed imposes a personal
jurisdiction limit on nonparty discovery, that the minimum
contacts framework should apply when testing that limit, and
that courts should alter their minimum contacts analysis for
nonparty witnesses by revisiting four concepts designed for de-
fendants: specific jurisdiction, unilateral activity, transient ju-
risdiction, and the "fair play and substantial justice" prong.
A. ALL BARK, ALL BITE: WHY DUE PROCESS IMPOSES A LIMIT
ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONPARTY WITNESSES
The first and most basic question is whether due process
138. See Elder-Beerman Stores, 45 F.R.D. at 518 (quashing a subpoena for
lack of personal jurisdiction where "the principal reason for the attempted ser-
vice of the subpoena here rather than in Georgia is that it would suit the con-
venience of counsel for the parties, who would suffer no legally recognizable
prejudice by being compelled to conduct their examination... in Georgia").
139. See First Am., 154 F.3d at 20 (noting that the nonparty witness had
"unique access to documents that may be critical in unraveling a bank fraud of
unprecedented scale").
140. See id. (suggesting that, as an auditor, the nonparty witness ought to
"feel a professional commitment" to clear up the dispute, given its "unique re-
sponsibility" to safeguard the integrity of financial data).
141. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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subjects nonparty discovery to a personal jurisdiction limit at
all. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect "persons,"
not "defendants," and nonparties certainly fit that descrip-
tion. Still, any interference with nonparty discovery based on
personal jurisdiction could be assailed on various grounds: (1)
as unnecessary, given that discovery rules and statutes already
insulate nonparties from unreasonable discovery; (2) as ill-
advised, in light of modern policy to promote liberal discovery;
(3) as antiquated, based on advances in technology that reduce
the inconvenience and cost of testifying for nonparties; and (4)
as conceptually problematic, given the sharp differences in ju-
dicial treatment of nonparty discovery and defendant liability.
Of these objections, only the last can survive any serious analy-
sis, and even it cannot overcome the strong countervailing
grounds for finding a constitutional personal jurisdiction limit
to nonparty discovery.
1. Objections to a Due Process Limit
a. Why Bother?
Initially, bringing due process to bear on requests as mun-
dane as nonparty document requests and depositions may seem
unnecessary, given the statutory and procedural protections al-
ready in place for nonparties.13 Undoubtedly many subpoenas
that would face a personal jurisdiction challenge fail for other
reasons, like the 100-mile limit on deposition subpoenas,"' be-
fore such concerns arise. The potential that courts can guard
against burdensome discovery by using other tools, however,
does not obviate the need for, and certainly does not disprove
the existence of, concurrent constitutional protection.4 5 Federal
and state courts today routinely treat the personal jurisdiction
inquiry for defendants in two steps. First, they determine
whether the state long-arm statute confers personal jurisdic-
142. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
143. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
144. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). Recall, however, that the 100-mile
limit applies only to forms of discovery requiring "travel," and thus provides no
protection against production of documents or tangible things. See id.
145. But see Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 809-10 (upholding jurisdiction
in part because of the protection typically afforded to the interests of absent
class-action plaintiffs by state class certification and related rules); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483-84 (1985) (upholding jurisdiction
in part because of the availability of a transfer of venue to protect defendant's
interest in securing the testimony of key witnesses).
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tion over the defendant. Second, they determine whether per-
sonal jurisdiction would comport with due process under the
minimum contacts test.4 6 This approach predominates despite
the fact that some state long-arm statutes already offer protec-
tion coextensive with, or greater than, the due process mini-
mum."' Thus, so long as state or federal nonparty discovery
rules run the risk of overreaching their territorial limits,148 a
constitutional standard would operate as a crucial "backstop" to
existing procedural rules and statutes.149
b. The Liberal Discovery Imperative
Widely recognized judicial policy in support of liberal dis-
covery may counsel against a due process limit on personal ju-
risdiction for nonparties. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized the existence 50 and value' 5' of liberal civil discovery
rules. Indeed, several of the Court's decisions rely on parties'
freedom to obtain broad discovery in determining substantive• 152 Fe r
requirements. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encour-
age a "broad search for facts." 53 Trial courts could therefore
146. E.g., Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 2000);
36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 441 (2002).
147. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 1068.
148. The many cases in which nonparties have raised a personal jurisdic-
tion defense to discovery make it difficult to imagine that courts perfectly po-
lice the territorial reach of the subpoena power relying on procedural rules
alone. See supra Part I.C.
149. If state long-arm statutes offer any guide, the formal recognition by
the Court of a due process personal jurisdictional limit for nonparty discovery
might prompt states to adopt discovery rules "coextensive" with the constitu-
tional standard.
150. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002) (noting
that federal courts follow "liberal discovery rules"); Societd Nationale Indus-
trielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 540-41 (1987)
(stating that procedural rules such as the Hague Evidence Convention may be
used by district courts to facilitate gathering evidence).
151. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("[Tlhe deposition-
discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.... Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation.").
152. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989)
(holding that a specific causation requirement is essential to a prima facie case
alleging disparate impact and is not unreasonable, since "liberal discovery
rules give plaintiffs broad access to employers' records"); Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (affirming that the plaintiff bears
the burden to prove that a proffered explanation for an adverse employment
action is pretextual, based in part on the availability of expansive discovery).
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note (1946 amendment).
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rightly complain about any constitutional doctrine that im-
pinges on the truth-seeking function of discovery, 54 particularly
one that could generate new satellite litiqation in an already
inefficient stage of American legal process.
Yet liberal pretrial discovery has well-recognized limits.
The Supreme Court has instructed the judiciary to minimize
the cost and inconvenience of discovery, 5 6 and federal and state
courts have developed a host of protections aimed specifically at
nonparties. 11 7 These statutory and judge-made exceptions have
emerged despite the fact that they cut against the truth-
seeking function of discovery.18 In the end, while policy argu-
ments in favor of liberal discovery may encourage narrow and
careful limits on the subpoena power, they do not propose
unlimited discovery. 9
c. Discovery Without Borders
Personal jurisdiction limits for nonparty discovery might
seem quaint in light of technological developments that dra-
matically reduce the burdens of nonparty testimony and docu-
ment production. Some observers contend that advances in
technology have rendered strict territorial limitations on the
154. See Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir.
2002) (noting a strong public policy in favor of liberal discovery rules); Burke
v. New York City Police Dep't, 115 F.R.D. 220, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting
that "ordinarily the overriding policy is one of disclosure of relevant informa-
tion in the interest of promoting the search for truth").
155. Cf Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000
Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 22
(2001) (noting the potential for new satellite litigation stemming from changes
to Rule 26(b)(1)).
156. Societ6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
157. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
158. Cf. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996) (upholding testimonial
privilege despite the fact that it would impair truth seeking); Ferguson v.
Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Adequate dis-
covery, however, does not mean unfettered discovery.").
159. Indeed, all limits on personal jurisdiction over defendants inevitably
undermine the justice-seeking function of the forum state, and cut against the
interest of the plaintiff. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980). Rather than disposing of a constitutional standard for
personal jurisdiction, these functions and interests have informed the consti-
tutional standard. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text. The same
principle should apply to personal jurisdiction over nonparty witnesses. See
infra notes 280-97 and accompanying text for proposals modifying the "fair
play and substantial justice" prong of the minimum contacts analysis.
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subpoena power of courts obsolete. 6 ° Calling such limits "a tri-
umph of form over substance," 6' they argue that the availabil-
ity of live satellite testimony at trial, Internet communications,
live videoconferencing, and other technological advances 162 have
reduced the burden on nonresident witnesses to the point
where those burdens can never outweigh the truth-seeking
value of discovery.'63
Whatever the merit of these observations for the drafters of
civil procedure rules, advances in technology cannot eliminate
constitutional due process protections for nonparty witnesses.
Initially, the "burden" of nonparty discovery goes beyond the
cost of transportation and photocopying, and includes the time
and expense involved in assembling and explaining informa-
• 164
tion, the potential embarrassment of placing private informa-
tion into the public record, 6' and the business risk associated
with surrendering confidential information about internal prac-
tices and external negotiations.'66 Further, the Supreme Court
160. See, e.g., Cathaleen A. Roach, It's Time to Change the Rule Compelling
Witness Appearance at Trial: Proposed Revisions to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 45(e), 79 GEO. L.J. 81, 90 (1990) (arguing that developments in technol-
ogy have collided with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leaving them rigid
and antiquated).
161. Id. at 90.
162. See Bayer AG v. Biovail Labs., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 192, 195 (D.P.R.
1999) (denying motion to transfer venue in part because the defendants could
"easily make use of all modern means of communication and take advantage of
all available technological advances in the discovery process and in prepara-
tion for trial regardless of the court's venue"); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza
Hotel Fire Litig., 129 F.R.D. 424, 425-26 (D.P.R. 1989) (requiring witnesses
beyond the district court's 100-mile trial subpoena power to give testimony by
live satellite transmission, stating that "the Court favors entering the new age
of communications technology").
163. See Roach, supra note 160, at 84.
164. See Buchanan v. Am. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1983)
(noting the unreasonable burden involved in calling a nonparty expert witness
and "requir[ing] him to spend a large amount of time itemizing and explaining
the raw data"); United States v. CBS, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 365, 367 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (noting that the nonparty witness corporation had produced roughly six
million documents at a cost of over two million dollars to comply with
discovery orders).
165. See Miller v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., No. 98-1012, 1999 WL 506520,
at *11 (10th Cir. July 19, 1999) (affirming the district court's order limiting
discovery against nonparty witnesses in sexual harassment suit against a uni-
versity, where the plaintiff sought to subpoena the names of women on the
former president's list of women who, "based on rumor and innuendo," may
also have suffered sexual harassment).
166. See Builders Ass'n v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 1122, 2001 WL
1002480, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2001) (quashing some 500 subpoenas seeking
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has made clear that defendants have an individual right to
avoid the jurisdiction of a forum state with which they lack
167
minimum contacts, even if for practical reasons they would
face little or no inconvenience by litigating in the forum.
68
Likewise, a personal jurisdiction limit for nonparty discovery
stems from an individual right to avoid invasive discovery even
if for practical reasons a witness would face little or no incon-
venience by providing testimony or documents in the forum.
d. Liability and Discovery
The strongest argument for the proposition that the Con-
stitution imposes no territorial limit on nonparty discovery goes
to the conceptual differences between liability and discovery.
Several courts have found that territorial limits for defendants• 169
simply do not apply to nonparty witnesses. Plausible distinc-
tions can be drawn. Jurisdiction to adjudicate a defendant's
rights evolved far differently from jurisdiction to issue discov-
ery orders.70 Also, while a defendant's liability depends on
some substantive cause of action, discovery requests implicate
essentially "procedural" concerns. 71 Thus, unlike final judg-
ments as to liability, discovery orders are rarely appealable,
leaving considerable discretion in the hands of trial courts. At
statistical data from Chicago-area contractors and subcontractors). The court
noted that "many of the subpoena recipients are bystanders both to this law-
suit and to the City contracts at issue" and expressed reluctance "to use the
judicial power to compel non-parties to provide their sensitive business records
to create data for a party's expert witness." Id.
167. See infra notes 179-83 and accompanying text (summarizing the Su-
preme Court's recognition in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 465 U.S. 694 (1982), of an individual liberty interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause).
168. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294
(1980) ("Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another state ... the Due Proc-
ess Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes
act to divest the state of its power to render a valid judgment.").
169. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
170. Compare supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text with supra notes
20-33 and accompanying text.
171. E.g., Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Vratil, 96 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1996) (noting that discovery is considered procedural, and thus governed
by federal law rather than state law under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny).
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (granting circuit courts appellate jurisdic-
tion only from "final decisions of the district courts of the United States"). Un-
der the federal rules, in a district other than the one where the action is pend-
ing a party may immediately appeal the denial of a nonparty discovery
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bottom, defendant liability and nonparty discovery involve dif-
ferent consequences, even if at times "it is unclear which way
that should cut."
173
The question, however, is not whether real differences exist
between defendant liability and nonparty discovery, but
whether those differences shift nonparty discovery into an ex-
traconstitutional zone where territorial limits on jurisdictiont. 174
dissolve. That proposition seems dubious on its face. True,
nonparty. discovery and defendant liability developed inde-
pendently, but the two bodies of law also share a number of his-
torical parallels: both began with strict territorial limitations,
evolved gradually to accommodate changing commercial and
legal practice, and today permit a liberal scope of judicial ac-
tion. That both might also involve a constitutional outer limit
on personal jurisdiction does not run counter to this history.7 6
Admittedly, discovery involves procedural rather than substan-
tive concerns, but this difference hardly disqualifies discovery
from the realm of due process. If anything, procedural fairness
falls closer to the heart of the Due Process Clause than does
substantive or policy fairness. 7 Notably, in spite of the intui-
request, because this is deemed to be a final decision in the ancillary proceed-
ing. See Tenkku v. Normandy Bank, 218 F.3d 926, 927 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000). In
contrast, a party may not immediately appeal the granting of a nonparty dis-
covery request, because such a ruling does not amount to a final judgment. In
re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 83, 87 (3d Cir. 2002). A nonparty faced
with a discovery motion granted by the district court has no option but to re-
fuse discovery, receive an order of contempt, and then file an immediate ap-
peal of the contempt order. See id. at 87-88. This strategy, of course, "is a dif-
ficult path to appellate review, and one that may carry with it a significant
penalty for failure." Id. at 89.
173. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir.
1998).
174. Cf. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization,
Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988) (holding that a nonparty witness charged with con-
tempt may challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the underly-
ing suit, because the subpoena power "cannot be more extensive than its juris-
diction"); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950) (noting
that "[tihe judicial subpoena power not only is subject to specific constitutional
limitations... but also is subject to those limitations inherent in the body that
issues them because of the Judiciary Article of the Constitution").
175. See Wasserman, supra note 111, at 46-48, 52-55.
176. See id. at 49, 91 (noting that at common law "the scope of a court's
subpoena power and its jurisdictional authority were coextensive" and that
this "historical linkage" suggests a comparable due process standard).
177. Cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Procedural fairness, if not all that originally
was meant by due process of law, is at least what it most uncompromisingly
requires.").
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tive differences between defendant liability and nonparty dis-
covery, the majority of courts to consider the question have held
that some personal jurisdiction standard applies to both.'78
2. The Case for a Constitutional Standard
There are several strong countervailing arguments that
the Due Process Clause does impose a personal jurisdiction
limit on nonparty discovery. First, defendants and nonparties
alike possess an "individual liberty interest" under the Due
Process Clause, 7 9 and defending against a lawsuit in a distant
forum and enduring discovery in a distant forum both threaten
that interest. The Court casts this liberty interest as "not being
subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which [a per-
son] has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or rela-
tions.""8 The animating concerns it addresses include the lack
of "fair warning that a particular activity may subject a person
to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign" 8' and the assurance of
"a degree of predictability to the legal system" by allowing peo-
ple to structure their actions to avoid unexpected litigation.
8 2
Those concerns seem equally applicable to nonparty witnesses,
who face indisputable burdens to their liberty when compelled
to testify in someone else's lawsuit.
183
Second, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts strongly suggests
that the personal jurisdiction requirement is not limited to de-
fendants.'8 In that case, the Court declined to adopt a mini-
mum contacts requirement for absent class-action plaintiffs de-
spite finding that they possessed a constitutionally viable
liberty interest. 85 Arguably, some of the factors that guided the
Court's treatment of absent class-action plaintiffs apply equally
178. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
179. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982) (holding that the Due Process Clause "is the only
source of the personal jurisdiction requirement," which must be seen as "ulti-
mately a function of the individual liberty interest").
180. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
181. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
182. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
183. Cf. FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d
1300, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (applying both minimum contacts and a
"[pirocedural due process" requirement of "adequate notice and an opportunity
to be heard" to a nonparty served with an FTC subpoena).
184. 472 U.S. 797, 806-14 (1985) (discussing requirements for personal ju-
risdiction over class-action plaintiffs).
185. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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to nonparty witnesses: a nonparty witness does not face "the
full powers of the State to render judgment against it," and
does not risk default judgment.' All of the other factors enu-
merated in Phillips Petroleum, however, suggest that nonparty
witnesses face burdens more comparable to defendants than
absent class-action plaintiffs. Unlike absent class-action plain-
tiffs, nonparties facing discovery may be required to "hire coun-
,,117 fc
sel and travel to the forum, may face "extended and often
costly discovery,"'88 and "may also face liability for court costs
and attorney's fees." 189 Nonparty witnesses also face the risk of
a contempt order, 9 ° which certainly qualifies as a binding
judgment.' 9 ' The Phillips Petroleum holding reflected the
Court's belief that absent class-action plaintiffs "may sit back
and allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing
that there are safeguards provided for [their] protection. " 192 The
same cannot be said of nonparty witnesses, who must play an
active role in the litigation, potentially at considerable expense,
and with no potential reward.' 93 Between these personal juris-
diction poles, where defendants receive maximum protection
because they face maximum risk, and absent class-action plain-
tiffs receive zero protection because they face zero risk, non-
party witnesses fall closer to the former than the latter.
Third, the threat of a contempt order for failure to comply
with discovery implies a constitutional limit to the territorial
186. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 808.
187. Id. at 808. Even simple discovery requests may require the retention
of counsel and sizeable time and production costs.
188. Id. Rule 45 allows for nonparty discovery as expansive as adverse
party discovery under Rule 26(b). FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d) advisory committee's
note (1946 amendment).
189. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 808. Rule 45(e) authorizes sanctions
for "[flailure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena." FED.
R. Civ. P. 45(e).
190. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
191. See FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d
1300, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting the potentially severe consequences of
failing to comply with an administrative agency's subpoena); Elder-Beerman
Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 515, 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (speculating that a higher due process standard presumably applies to
out-of-state nonparty witnesses than to out-of-state defendants); In re Abrams,
166 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that the consequences of
failing to respond to a subpoena usually exceed those of failing to respond to a
summons, which usually results in a default judgment that can later be set
aside).
192. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 810.
193. See Wasserman, supra note 111, at 108 n.298.
996 [Vol 88:968
2004] JURISDICTION FOR NONPARTY DISCOVERY
reach of courts. The effectiveness of court-ordered discovery de-
pends on the serious consequences that follow from noncompli-
ance.' Every discovery order is a contempt order waiting to
happen.'9 Because courts readily acknowledge the need for
proper personal jurisdiction over a nonparty before issuing a
contempt order,'96 nonparty discovery-or at least nonparty dis-
covery with any teeth-must face comparable personal jurisdic-
tion limitations.'
97
For these reasons, due process must impose some personal
jurisdiction limit on nonparty discovery. Despite a number of
basic differences between defendants and nonparty witnesses,
the nature of the liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, as explained in Phillips Petroleum, supports a limit on
the territorial reach of American courts in both contexts.
B. BEST IN SHOW: WHY THE MINIMUM CONTACTS TEST
PROVIDES THE PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER NONPARTY WITNESSES
Having concluded that due process imposes some personal
jurisdiction limit on nonparty discovery, the next question is
whether courts should teach the "old dog" of minimum contacts
the "new trick" of evaluating personal jurisdiction for nonparty
194. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e) (authorizing an order of "contempt of the
court" for failing to obey a subpoena "without adequate excuse"). Courts rely
on the threat of sanctions, even if imposed sparingly, to ensure compliance
with their discovery orders. Even the word "subpoena," from the Latin sub
poena, translates as "under penalty." Wasserman, supra note 111, at 44.
195. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 105, § 45.04[6] [b].
196. See Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund of Local Union # 58 v. Gary's
Elec. Serv. Co., 340 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 2003) (contrasting "the minority
view suggesting that personal jurisdiction over a non-party for contempt only
can be achieved through service of process" with the "majority view allowing
personal jurisdiction for contempt over officers or corporate employees if they
have notice of the injunction and its contents"); Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763
F.2d 711, 721 (5th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging the general need for minimum
contacts with the forum before issuing a contempt order against a nonparty,
but noting that where "a nonparty has aided a party in knowingly violating an
injunction," due process is satisfied); United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
945 F. Supp. 609, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (calling the personal jurisdiction re-
quirement "a basic principle of first-year civil procedure" and applying it to a
nonparty facing a contempt order).
197. See Silverman v. Berkson, 661 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. 1995) (noting
that even though contempt orders against out-of-state nonparty witnesses are
entitled to full faith and credit, other states must guarantee their residents
due process and must decide, as a threshold matter, "whether the state ren-
dering the judgment had jurisdiction").
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witnesses. Because the most promising alternative standards
have significant weaknesses and stray too far from the Su-
preme Court's conception of personal jurisdiction, this Note
concludes that the minimum contacts test provides the most
sensible framework for evaluating personal jurisdiction in the
context of nonparty discovery.
1. Alternatives to Minimum Contacts
Before determining the changes required, if any, to make
the minimum contacts analysis workable for nonparty discov-
ery, two viable alternatives merit consideration: (1) a "mean-
ingful inconvenience" standard;19 8 and (2) an "interest in the
lawsuit" standard, adapted from the common law rule.199
Weaknesses in both of these standards make the minimum
contacts framework a superior starting point for nonparty wit-
nesses.
a. Meaningful Inconvenience
Professor Rhonda Wasserman has argued that the proper
test for evaluating personal jurisdiction over nonparty wit-
nesses should consist of two inquiries: first, whether the non-
party would suffer meaningful inconvenience by testifying in
the distant forum; and second, whether despite that inconven-
ience the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."200 Her stan-
dard would measure meaningful inconvenience based on the
cost differential between discovery in the proposed forum and
discovery in the witness's "home" forum.20 ' Wasserman rejects
minimum contacts with the forum as a factor in this personal
jurisdiction formula.2 2
198. Wasserman, supra note 111, at 96-97.
199. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text (describing the common
law bill of discovery).
200. Wasserman, supra note 111, at 96-97 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
201. Id. at 96. Professor Wasserman calls attention to the variety of bur-
dens faced by nonparty witnesses, including "the anxiety of having to testify in
public, perhaps against a friend or even a dangerous criminal, and the time
required to prepare for trial, including the time required to meet with counsel,
travel to and from the courthouse, and testify or wait to testify." Id. at 95.
Other burdens include forum-specific procedural laws, such as "state laws re-
garding compensation for time and reimbursement for travel expenses ...
[and] state laws regarding testimonial privilege." Id. at 95-96.
202. Id. at 96-97 (noting that "[sitate boundaries.., provide poor proxies
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While defensible on its own terms, Wasserman's model
does not square with the Supreme Court's understanding of
due process limits on personal jurisdiction. Wasserman's rejec-
tion of state boundaries as a meaningful component of the
analysis" rests on three premises: that the Supreme Court has
roundly rejected "horizontal sovereignty" as the animating the-
ory for limits on personal jurisdiction,0 4 that geography does
not matter to the degree of inconvenience suffered by a defen-
dant or nonparty, 0 5 and that nonparty discovery deserves a
lower level of constitutional protection than does defendant li-
ability.26 None of these premises withstands a close reading of
the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction cases.
First, the meaningful inconvenience standard is premised
on the Supreme Court's rejection of horizontal sovereignty as a
basis for the constitutional limit on personal jurisdiction. Hori-
zontal sovereignty, the traditional theory that states lack au-
thority to enforce rules and exert jurisdiction over persons in
the territory of another state, has waxed and waned as an un-
derlying theory for a due process limit on personal jurisdic-
tion.0 7 The Supreme Court appeared to seal its fate in a foot-
note in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee,20 8 by declaring that the Due Process Clause "is the
only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement," which
must be seen as "ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest" rather than "federalism concerns." 20 9 Taking a cue
from this apparent downplaying of state lines in the personal
jurisdiction formula, Wasserman argues that minimum con-
tacts should no longer matter, and that due process protects
both defendants and nonparty witnesses only if they would suf-
fer meaningful inconvenience in a distant forum. 10
The Court in Ireland, however, did not purport to do away
for convenience").
203. See id. at 110.
204. Id. at 58-59.
205. Id. at 63.
206. See id. at 109.
207. See generally Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of "State Sover-
eignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdic-
tion, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 709-27 (1983) (describing the Court's shift-
ing account of the role that interstate comity and sovereignty play in the due
process requirement of personal jurisdiction).
208. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
209. Id. at 703 n.10.
210. Wasserman, supra note 111, at 59-60.
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with minimum contacts, even as it rejected the horizontal sov-
ereignty rationale, expressly holding that the requirement of
contacts with the forum state retained vitality as "a function of
the individual liberty interest" protected by the Due Process
Clause.21' Moreover, however valid the academic criticisms,212 in
the twenty years since Ireland the Court has not signaled a re-
treat from the minimum contacts framework.213 Thus any stan-
dard that eliminates contacts from the personal jurisdiction
calculus appears irreconcilable with the widespread judicial
understanding of due process. 14
Second, the meaningful inconvenience test rests on the
corollary premise that geography plays virtually no role in the
level of inconvenience suffered by a defendant or nonparty wit-215
ness. Wasserman points to the availability of "[a]ir travel,
telephones, fax machines, and other burden-reducing technolo-
gies" as evidence that defending or testifying in a distant forum
has become less burdensome. 16 Yet even while acknowledging
those innovations in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme
Court rejected the idea that "state lines are irrelevant for juris-
dictional purposes."2 7 Simply put, geography does play an im-
portant role in the degree of inconvenience suffered by a defen-
dant or witness.218 State and national boundaries act as a
valuable, and easily administered, proxy for inconvenience.219
211. Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703 n.10.
212. See Lewis, supra note 207, at 723; Wasserman, supra note 111, at 59
n. 107 (collecting scholarship critical of the Court's approach).
213. In fact, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the minimum contacts
approach just three years after Ireland in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985).
214. Neither Phillips Petroleum nor Ireland contradicts this conclusion. In
Phillips Petroleum, the Court determined that no personal jurisdiction limit
applied to absent class-action plaintiffs. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 847-48 (1999) (discussing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 606-08 (1985)). In Ireland, the trial court properly exercised personal ju-
risdiction based on consent, not on minimum contacts. See supra note 53.
215. Wasserman, supra note 111, at 63.
216. Id.
217. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
218. Cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114-15
(1987) (holding unconstitutional the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a Cali-
fornia court over a Japanese subcomponent manufacturer forced to defend an
indemnification action against a Taiwanese tire manufacturer, citing the
"unique burdens" such a distant forum would impose).
219. Professor Wasserman offers an example: "[A] Philadelphia witness
compelled to travel 300 miles to Pittsburgh faces greater universal burdens
than if compelled to travel fifteen miles to Camden, New Jersey." Wasserman,
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Third, and most basically, the meaningful inconvenience
standard rests on the assumption that due process imposes a
weaker standard for out-of-state nonparty witnesses than it
does for out-of-state defendants.22 ° The Second Circuit has ech-
oed this proposition, reasoning that the consequences of a di-
rect judgment, as opposed to simply discovery, result in a
meaningfully higher level of risk for defendants.2
Other courts have disagreed, however, noting that a non-
party witness faces the real risk of contempt sanctions and
supra note 111, at 97. While this may prove her point that "assertions of ex-
traterritorial subpoena power.., would not necessarily expose a witness to
greater universal burdens than an assertion of in-state subpoena power," id.,
it takes little imagination to name other forums (Seattle, Houston, and Hono-
lulu come to mind) where the burden would be considerably higher, based
solely on geography. Further, the example fails to acknowledge the kind of
complex international nonparty discovery becoming commonplace in American
courts. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
220. Professor Wasserman raises the practical concern that a heightened
standard for defendants carries little risk because in the event of a dismissal,
the plaintiff is likely to refile in another state where the court has jurisdiction
over the defendant. Wasserman, supra note 111, at 62 n.118, 96 n.246. In con-
trast, a plaintiff is "less likely to change the forum to obtain subpoena power
over a nonparty witness." Id. at 96 n.246. According to Wasserman, a height-
ened standard for nonparty witnesses would therefore unreasonably discour-
age discovery of important testimony.
This reasoning, however, gives short shrift to the widespread availability
of subpoena service in a nonparty's home forum. Rule 45 authorizes service in
any other United States district to obtain testimony relevant to an action
pending in federal court. Interstate compensatory statutes make testimony
available, with some restrictions, to actions pending in state courts.
Wasserman, supra note 111, at 78-91; see also id. at 120-21 (noting that state
compensatory statutes often result in difficult choices between expensive in-
terstate practice and forgoing the testimony altogether). A host of discovery
treaties governs the acquisition of testimony from international nonparty wit-
nesses. See, e.g., Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555. While these methods may
prove less convenient for the parties than would universal nationwide or
worldwide subpoena service, they ease fears that limiting the reach of the
subpoena power might effectively deter discovery from nonresidents.
Further, Wasserman's suggestion that denying personal jurisdiction over
a defendant simply prompts refiling in another forum does not hold up in
practice. The same claim may be doomed under the substantive law of a dif-
ferent state or circuit, may be time-barred, or may prove too costly and incon-
venient to litigate in a distant forum. Yet the due process standard for defen-
dants does not change when failing to exercise jurisdiction would mean, for
practical or legal reasons, that the defendant would escape liability altogether.
Likewise, the due process standard for nonparty discovery should not change
based on the possibility that the witness may escape discovery altogether.
221. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
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other burdens comparable to those faced by a defendant. 222 Ul-
timately, the meaningful inconvenience standard, like any
standard that presumes a lower level of due process protection
for nonparty discovery than for defendants, fails not because it
misapprehends the relative level of risk faced by nonparty wit-
nesses,222 but because it misapprehends the relative level of in-
terest, stake, involvement, and expectation a nonparty witness
has in someone else's lawsuit.224 A witness with no dog in the
fight deserves as much constitutional protection as a defendant
who got himself into the mess.2 2 5
b. An Interest in the Lawsuit
A second potential due process standard comes from the
common law "mere witness" rule that parties could not seek
equitable discovery from nonparties who lacked an interest in
the underlying dispute. 6 The rule has some intuitive appeal:
when a nonparty has a large stake or close involvement in a
suit, the forum ought to have greater access to the nonparty's
testimony and documents, whereas when a nonparty has no
stake and little involvement in a suit, the nonparty ought to en-
joy greater protection from territorial overreaching by courts. 227
Also, the common law roots of the interest standard make it an
attractive option for those who hold that the scope of due proc-
ess depends in part on historical pedigree.228
Two serious deficiencies make the interest standard inap-
propriate. First, it examines only a nonparty's contacts with the
underlying lawsuit, presumably established by showing connec-
tions with the parties or the transactions involved. 229 As will be
222. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
223. See Wasserman, supra note 111, at 110 (noting, correctly, that "a de-
fendant may well be subpoenaed to testify and then would face the same risks
as the nonparty witness").
224. See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998).
225. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (adopt-
ing a due process standard for absent class-action plaintiffs based not only on
the level of risk they faced but on their role, stake, and expectations in the
lawsuit).
226. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
227. See Welling, supra note 23, at 135 n.133 (discussing the rationale un-
derlying the "mere witness" rule).
228. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (relying on the long history of in personam jurisdiction in American
courts in holding that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone comports
with due process).
229. See Welling, supra note 23, at 134-35 (noting that under the "mere
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discussed further, a personal jurisdiction standard must meas-
ure contacts with the forum, rather than the suit, to remain
consistent with the Supreme Court's understanding of the
power of courts to hale persons into a distant state. Second, an
interest standard would provide too little guidance to courts at-
tempting to sketch the limits of the subpoena power. The mere
witness rule proved so imprecise in equity courts that it de-
volved into a virtual per se rule against nonparty bills of dis-
230
covery.
2. Advantages of the Minimum Contacts Framework
In contrast to these alternatives, the minimum contacts
framework boasts several advantages. Some fifty years after
International Shoe, it has become the foremost-indeed, the
only-modern standard for evaluating personal jurisdiction
under the Due Process Clause.23' Further, because of its ubiq-
uity, Supreme Court cases developing and applying the mini-
mum contacts framework have become immediately familiar to
practitioners."2 While important questions about the operation
of the test inevitably remain unanswered, until the Court
changes direction the minimum contacts approach must serve
as the incumbent technique in evaluating personal jurisdiction
over both defendants and nonparty witnesses.233
C. NEW TRICKS: HOW THE MINIMUM CONTACTS FRAMEWORK
MUST CHANGE TO EVALUATE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
NONPARTY WITNESSES
Despite its advantages, the minimum contacts framework
requires a number of modifications in the context of nonparty
discovery. The remainder of this Note identifies and offers rec-
ommendations relating to four awkward aspects of the mini-
mum contacts analysis as applied to nonparty witnesses: spe-
cific jurisdiction, unilateral activity, transient jurisdiction, and
the "fair play and substantial justice" prong.
witness" rule, "the person from whom discovery was sought had to be a party
to the main litigation or at least have an interest in the litigation" (citations
omitted)).
230. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
231. See Twitchell, supra note 69, at 611.
232. Id.
233. See Wasserman, supra note 111, at 142 (noting that a minimum con-
tacts approach to personal jurisdiction for nonparty discovery would allow
courts to "'piggyback' on existing jurisdictional analysis").
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1. Specific Jurisdiction in Nonparty Discovery
One awkward aspect of importing the minimum contacts
test to nonparty discovery concerns the treatment of "specific
jurisdiction." A court exercises specific jurisdiction when the
cause of action "aris[es] out of or relate[s] to" a defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state.234 Limited contacts, even a single
contact, can satisfy the due process minimum under a specific
jurisdiction standard. 235 Two plausible interpretations of spe-
cific jurisdiction in the nonparty discovery context illustrate the
difficulty the concept poses.
Read broadly, specific jurisdiction could require simply
that the discovery request "arise out of or relate to" the lawsuit.
The court in In re Jee 6 took this approach, holding that specific
jurisdiction over a nonparty existed because "the documents
requested ... arise out of and are related to the litigation."37
This interpretation has serious flaws. First, it treats the
possession of any discoverable information, whether in the form
of documents or testimony, as a relevant contact. 38 This result
ignores the fact that personal jurisdiction reflects territorial
limits on the power of the court, and must therefore require
contacts with the forum,239 not with the parties or with the liti-
gation. Second, this interpretation results in a per se rule that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonparties for discov-
ery comports with due process. Requested documents will al-
ways relate to the litigation. Not only do the discovery rules
limit requests to matters "relevant to the claim or defense of
any party,"240 but parties presumably have no use for docu-
ments completely unrelated to the lawsuit.
Read narrowly, on the other hand, specific jurisdiction
could require that the cause of action "arise out of" the non-
party's contacts with the forum, tracking closely to the current
standard for defendants. 24' Again, this approach faces serious
234. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
n.8 (1984); see also supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
236. 104 B.R. 289 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
237. Id. at 294.
238. See id.
239. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8.
240. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
241. Cf. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8 (reasoning that a state exercises
specific jurisdiction when the cause of action "arise[s] out of or relate [s] to the
defendant's contacts with the forum").
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drawbacks. First, although emphasizing the "cause of action"
makes sense when discussing defendants, because a cause of
action directly targets the defendant, that starting point makes
less sense in the context of nonparty discovery. Nonparties face
242
no direct threat from the underlying cause of action. Second,
the narrow interpretation makes specific jurisdiction effectively
unavailable in nonparty discovery. A nonparty, by definition,
does not possess the precise contacts with the forum that gave
rise to the cause of action-if anyone, only the defendant does.
As a result, this standard, if adopted, would leave only general
jurisdiction available for nonparty witnesses,243 meaning no
nonparty could be compelled to testify without "the kind of con-
tinuous and systematic" contacts that would support jurisdic-
tion with respect to any action or order.
Thus, a broad interpretation makes personal jurisdiction
inevitable and a narrow interpretation makes it impossible.
Nevertheless, specific jurisdiction can be salvaged in the con-
text of nonparty discovery. The proper analysis would focus on
the relationship between (1) the discovery request and (2) the
242. On the other hand, the narrow reading might ease the court's burden,
because, rather than evaluating personal jurisdiction for each discovery re-
quest individually, a court could pass on the question once for all discovery re-
lated to the cause of action. This advantage should not be overstated, however,
considering the lively debate regarding the merits of "supplemental personal
jurisdiction" over defendants, which allows jurisdiction over defendants for
multiple claims in a suit based on a single claim that bears a sufficient rela-
tionship to the defendant's contacts with the forum. See generally Jason A.
Yonan, Note, An End to Judicial Overreaching in Nationwide Service of Proc-
ess Cases: Statutory Authorization to Bring Supplemental Personal Jurisdic-
tion Within Federal Courts' Powers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 557, 562-68 (2002)
(providing a judicial and statutory background of supplemental jurisdiction). A
comparable doctrine could allow supplemental personal jurisdiction over non-
party witnesses based on a single discovery request that bears a sufficient re-
lationship to the nonparty's contacts with the forum. Regardless, where courts
have refused to recognize supplemental personal jurisdiction, they have shown
a willingness to evaluate contacts related to each count of a complaint sepa-
rately. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal
Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619, 1641 (2001) (noting, in her discussion of
pendant personal jurisdiction, that courts limit proceedings to counts over
which they have jurisdiction and exclude those over which they do not). They
would presumably do the same for a series of discovery requests directed at
the same nonparty.
243. Cf Ramirez v. Lagunes, 794 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. App. 1990) (dis-
missing a bill of discovery against a nonparty bank for lack of personal juris-
diction, holding that "merely locating monies in a Texas bank account did not
invoke the court's jurisdiction because . . . the cause of action [for divorce did
not arise] from the opening of those accounts").
244. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
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nonparty's contacts with the forum. This interpretive middle
ground cures the defects of both the broad and narrow readings
by focusing on the discovery request that targets the nonparty,
and requiring contacts with the forum to reflect the underlying
territorial limitation at issue. Table 1 summarizes this analy-
sis:
Secific juris- arises out of or Comments
diction exists relates to ...
where ...
the cause of action defendant contacts current standard for
with the forum. defendants
the discovery the lawsuit, broad standard, results
request in per se specific juris-
diction over nonparty
witnesses
the cause of action nonparty contacts narrow standard, makes
with the forum, specific jurisdiction over
nonparty witnesses
impossible
the discovery nonparty contacts proposed standard for
request with the forum. nonparty witnesses
Table 1
For an illustration, suppose that Takao Sasaki, the non-
party witness discussed at the beginning of this Note, had been
served a document subpoena demanding his notes and records
from negotiations that took place in North Carolina." Under
the broad standard, the court would easily find specific jurisdic-
tion because the requested documents plainly relate to the sub-ject matter of the litigation. Under the narrow standard, the
court could not possibly find specific jurisdiction, because Sa-
saki's activities in New York in no way precipitated litigation
between the defendant and other insurance companies. The re-
sult under the proper standard would depend on whether the
document request arises out of or relates to Sasaki's contacts
with New York. On these facts, the proposed standard would
probably render specific jurisdiction unavailable. The subpoena
245. See supra notes 5-12. The court ultimately quashed the subpoena be-
cause it demanded that Sasaki give a deposition in New York, but upheld per-
sonal jurisdiction for other forms of discovery based on physical presence. See
In re Application for Order Quashing Deposition Subpoenas, dated July 16,
2002, No. M8-85, 2002 WL 1870084, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2002). For a
discussion of transient jurisdiction in the context of nonparty discovery, see
infra notes 262-77 and accompanying text.
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requested documents stored at Sasaki's office in Japan
prepared during contract negotiations held in North Carolina
years before any litigation began. The request thus bears no re-
lationship to Sasaki's infrequent, unrelated business trips to
New York, including the single negotiation session during
which he received service of the subpoena.246
2. The Unilateral Activity Rule in Nonparty Discovery
Another awkward aspect of importing the minimum con-
tacts test to nonparty discovery concerns the treatment of the
"unilateral activity" rule, which provides that "[t]he unilateral
activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresi-
dent defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum State."247 This rule reflects two underlying concerns:
first, that unilateral actions by third parties do not satisfy the
quid pro quo rationale by providing evidence of purposeful
availment of the benefits and protections of the forum state;
248
and second, that the unilateral actions of third parties fail to
give a defendant clear notice that it may face suit in the forum
state.249
Read expansively, the unilateral activity rule could com-
pletely foreclose discovery from out-of-state nonparties. Non-
party witnesses, after all, always face the jurisdiction of the
court due to the activity of the parties themselves, who unilat-
erally engaged in whatever conduct triggered the suit and
made the nonparty's information valuable. Such a facile read-
ing, however, interprets the unilateral activity rule too liter-
ally.25°
The real value of the unilateral activity rule for nonparties
comes from its implications for subpoenas against the most
sympathetic characters in the world of discovery: "innocent by-
standers" summoned to testify in someone else's lawsuit before
246. Importantly, however, a North Carolina court issuing the same sub-
poena could properly exercise specific jurisdiction over Sasaki under this stan-
dard; the requested documents were created by Sasaki in North Carolina as a
record of activities that took place in North Carolina, thus establishing the
requisite relationship between the discovery request and Sasaki's contacts
with the forum.
247. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see also supra notes 75-
76 and accompanying text (describing the unilateral activity rule).
248. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text (describing New Jer-
sey's approach in Silverman).
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a disant _251a distant court. For such persons, both of the Supreme
Court's concerns about unilateral activity seem particularly
applicable. First, the quid pro quo rationale that operates
against defendants who purposefully avail themselves of the
benefits and protections of the forum state does not make sense
against an innocent bystander, forced to bear the costs of dis-
covery merely for knowing something relevant to someone1 , 2,52
else's case or defense. Second, innocent bystanders by defini-
tion lack advance notice that their activities will subject them
to the subpoena power, and they are powerless to consciously
avoid service of a subpoena by refusing to witness the "unilat-
eral activity" of others. As a result, the unilateral activity rule
might provide considerable protection to an innocent bystander
subject to a subpoena from a distant court.
That parties might face an uphill battle to satisfy the uni-
lateral activity rule for innocent bystanders is not objection-
able. Due process has proven sensitive to differently situated
defendants,253 and should do the same for differently situated
nonparty witnesses. Further, as a practical matter, nonparty
witnesses in civil cases are seldom innocent bystanders. They
typically have inside information regarding the events or
transactions underlying the lawsuit,254 or have come under sus-
251. Cf. Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 38-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that
"some courts have been hesitant to require a non-party witness, who is an in-
nocent source of information and a stranger to the litigation, to be forced to
undergo hardship for the sake of discovery").
252. The requirement of purposeful availment "ensures that a defendant
will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,'
or 'attenuated' contacts." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). A
nonparty who obtains information while innocently standing by is always
haled before the court based on such contacts.
253. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-15
(1987) (holding that unique burdens on the foreign defendant rendered the ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction inconsistent with traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice).
254. See, for example, In re First American Corp., 184 F.R.D. 234, 242
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), in which the court refused to award expenses to a nonparty
witness who "was not the quintessential innocent, disinterested bystander."
The court reasoned that because of the role the nonparty played in the matter
about which the underlying litigation was concerned, the nonparty "should
have reasonably anticipated being drawn into subsequent litigation." Id.; see
also Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 609, 610 n.5 (1995)
("[Uinlike many nonparties, EBI was substantially involved in the underlying
transaction and could have anticipated that the contract on which it was a
subcontractor might, given its size, reasonably spawn some litigation, and dis-
covery of EBI.").
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S• 255
picion for their own wrongdoing. Also, parties could always
secure the testimony of an out-of-state innocent bystander
through a subpoena issued by a home forum that can properly
exercise general jurisdiction. 56 Retaining a version of the uni-
lateral activity rule for personal jurisdiction over nonparty wit-
nesses thus properly balances the evidentiary needs of litigants
with a minimum level of affirmative conduct, purposeful avail-
ment, and fair notice.257
For example, neither of the nonparty witnesses described
in the introduction would find any comfort under this reading
of the unilateral activity rule. Even in his personal capacity,
Claude Taittinger, the quintessential insider, had a substantial
economic stake and a significant role in the transactions that
precipitated the underlying French lawsuit,5 ' and he had am-
ple advance warning of impending litigation where his testi-
mony and documents might prove valuable. 259 Likewise, Takao
Sasaki acquired his discoverable information as an insider,
purposefully participating in the kind of profitable interna-
tional transactions that frequently become the subject of legal
disputes.2 " Assuming that the forum state had some basis for
specific jurisdiction given the relationship between the discov-
ery request and their contacts with the forum, 261 neither
255. See, e.g., SEC v. McGoff, 647 F.2d 185, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (describing
the witness as "not in any sense a disinterested third party called upon to
supply evidence" but as "the principal actor in the matters the SEC seeks to
investigate"); Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Sofamor Danek Group, 190
F.R.D. 463, 467 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (declining to require a heightened standard
of relevance for discovery from a nonparty because "[gliven [his] level of in-
volvement with the negotiations and subsequent dispute... [and] being a po-
tential party, the court is not inclined to view [him] as an innocent bystander
needlessly entangled in burdensome discovery"); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticom-
modity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that a non-
party witness was "not [an] innocent party caught up in events beyond its con-
trol" because its deliberate conduct had "placed itself in the thick of things").
256. See supra note 220 (describing the widespread availability of sub-
poena service in the nonparty and home forum).
257. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (citing cases that have
incorporated portions of the unilateral activity rule when evaluating personal
jurisdiction for nonparty witnesses).
258. See In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting as undis-
puted the fact that Taittinger possessed knowledge relevant to the litigation).
259. See Nigro, supra note 2.
260. See In re Application for Order Quashing Deposition Subpoenas, dated
July 16, 2002, No. M8-85, 2002 WL 1870084, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2002).
261. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
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Taittinger nor Sasaki could credibly invoke the unilateral activ-
ity rule.
3. Transient Jurisdiction for Nonparty Witnesses
Yet another source of difficulty in translating personal ju-
risdiction concepts to nonparty witnesses is the transient juris-
diction doctrine of Burnham v. Superior Court, which held that
personal service of summons on a defendant physically present
within state lines always satisfies due process.262 The Second
Circuit holds that "tag" jurisdiction applies equally to personal
service of a subpoena on a nonparty witness physically present
in the forum state, regardless of how fleeting the visit.
263
Unfortunately, the Second Circuit's analysis of the issue
failed to consider the competing rationales for the transient ju-
risdiction rule, relying mostly on factual comparisons between
the defendant in Burnham and the nonparty challenging the
subpoena.2 ' The principal opinions in Burnham reached the
same result for strikingly different reasons, however, and
courts should consider each of them before uncritically adopting
Burnham as the controlling standard for nonparty witnesses.
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion rested on the premise
that personal jurisdiction based on physical presence had an
ancient and enduring pedigree in American courts.265 For non-
party witnesses, however, the historical record leaves consider-
able room for debate. The equitable bill of discovery, which
served as the mainstay of pretrial civil discovery in American
courts until at least the 1930s, could not reach a mere witness
regardless of the circumstances of service. While civil discov-
ery rules have, for decades, authorized subpoenas against non-
parties using in-state service of a subpoena, these systems
might not enjoy a history ancient enough to compare with
analogous service rules for defendants 26 7-particularly if courts
262. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (discussing the histori-
cal inability of parties to obtain discovery against a "mere witness").
267. Compare supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (documenting
common law limitations on the bill of discovery with respect to nonparty wit-
nesses) with Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607-16 (1990) (Scalia,
J., plurality opinion) (documenting the ancient roots of transient jurisdiction
over defendants).
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take Justice Scalia at his word that "the crucial time ... [is]
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted."268 In the
nineteenth century, modern nonparty discovery would have
been altogether alien to American courts.".9 Strictly speaking,
however, these limits on the bill of discovery did not relate to
personal jurisdiction, but developed as substantive limitations
on the device itself.2 70 Thus, it could be argued that the long
history of transient jurisdiction always conferred jurisdiction
on nonparties physically present within state boundaries, but
that the equity courts simply declined to enforce discovery
against nonparties despite that jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan's concurrence, on the other hand, stuck
closer to the standard minimum contacts analysis. He noted
that the history of the transient jurisdiction rule gave visiting
defendants adequate notice, that physical presence necessarily
implies certain contacts that constitute purposeful availment,
and that even a single visit by the defendant suggests that the
burden of defending a suit in the forum state would be mini-
mal.2 71 This reasoning seems readily applicable to nonparty
witnesses. In-state subpoena service for nonparties, while per-
haps not "ancient," has persisted long enough to provide rea-
sonable notice to prospective witnesses when traveling to other
jurisdictions.272 Likewise, if physical presence in the state
amounts to constructive consent to jurisdiction as a defendant,
it probably amounts to constructive consent to submit to dis-
covery in the state as well.272 The theory that physical presence
implies a minimal burden in defending against a suit probably
268. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 611.
269. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (explaining Justice
Brennan's rationale in Burnham).
272. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20-21 (2d Cir.
1998). As Taittinger's and Sasaki's experiences show, however, fair notice of a
surprise subpoena in a distant forum exists in legal fiction, not in fact. Courts
readily acknowledge that nonparties have different expectations regarding the
burden and invasiveness of discovery than defendants. See Cusumano v. Mi-
crosoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998).
273. Professor Wasserman agrees that "[b]y entering the trial state volun-
tarily, the witness impliedly consent[s] to testify there," but adds the qualifier,
"on matters relating to her visit." Wasserman, supra note 111, at 143. The
transient jurisdiction rule for defendants goes further, of course, granting per-
sonal jurisdiction based on fleeting physical presence even if the cause of ac-
tion bears no relationship to the visit, or even to the forum state. See Burn-
ham, 495 U.S. at 610-11.
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holds up for nonparty witnesses as well, although their relative
stake in the outcome of the underlying action may affect that
assessment of burden. 4
While a close reading of the Burnham opinions leaves room
for doubt, the principle of transient jurisdiction should extend
to nonparty witnesses served a subpoena while physically pre-
sent in the forum state. Despite its potential for disconcerting
results," 5 the rule provides an easily administered, bright-line
standard for courts, and allows potential witnesses to pattern
their behavior with a high degree of certainty. 6 Rather than
recognize a constitutional exception to the well-entrenched be-
lief that states enjoy broad personal jurisdiction over all per-
sons found within their borders, courts should adopt a tran-
sient jurisdiction rule, corollary to that in Burnham, for
nonparty discovery.
4. Fair Play for Nonparty Witnesses
A final challenge in adapting the minimum contacts
framework to personal jurisdiction over nonparty witnesses in-
volves the multifactor reasonableness test that makes up its
"fair play and substantial justice" prong. For defendants, this
274. See infra notes 284-89 and accompanying text (discussing the role
that nonparty witnesses' stake and expectations should play).
275. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959)
(holding service of process valid where the defendant was served within the
"territorial limits of the State of Arkansas" while on board a passenger air-
plane flying from Memphis to Dallas).
276. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting Justice White's con-
cerns with "endless, fact-specific litigation" in his concurrence in Burnham).
277. If adopted, this proposal would unquestionably limit the instances in
which nonparty witnesses could successfully challenge a court's personal ju-
risdiction, because most states require personal service of every subpoena
somewhere within state boundaries. See supra notes 113-15 and accompany-
ing text. All federal courts, however, allow limited service of process outside
the boundaries of the district. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2). Some federal and state
administrative agencies have statutory authorization to serve subpoenas na-
tionwide. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 23 (2000) (permitting the same for antitrust ac-
tions under the Clayton Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1965(c) (2000) (authorizing nation-
wide service of subpoenas for civil and criminal actions under RICO); FTC v.
Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1308-09 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (construing 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976) (Federal Trade Commission Act)).
Furthermore, the Burnham rule applies only to individuals, not to corpora-
tions or other entities that may serve as nonparty witnesses. Wenche Siemer
v. Learget Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 182-83 (5th Cir. 1992). Thus, while
transient jurisdiction would effectively eliminate one category of challenges, it
would leave considerable room for disputes over the scope of due process pro-
tection in nonparty discovery.
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analysis weighs the burden on the nonresident defendant
against the interest of the forum state, the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining relief, the judicial system's interest in efficient reso-
lution of controversies, and substantive social policies. 278 These
factors require only slight revision when applied to nonparty
discovery.278
a. Burden on the Nonparty Witness
The initial factor courts should take into account in a rea-
sonableness test for nonparty witnesses is the burden imposed
on the nonparty witness.28 0 This factor should consider the in-
cremental costs faced by a nonparty subject to discovery in a
distant forum rather than a home forum:21 incremental out-of-
pocket costs associated with production, transportation, and de-
livery of information; incremental time and opportunity costs
incurred in responding to requests in a distant forum; and in-
cremental legal costs, such as the retention of local counsel and
additional state-specific legal demands, associated with the fo-
rum.212 These costs can cut both ways, of course, depending on
the anticipated costs for the out-of-state nonparty.8 3
Further, this factor should take into account the witness's
nonparty status, standing alone, by considering the full range
of burdens under the circumstances, regardless of the distance
of the forum.2  Such costs include the size, complexity, and in-
vasiveness of the discovery requested; the nonincremental
monetary, time, and legal costs of responding; the embarrass-
ment or hardship caused to the nonparty through compelled
testimony; and the strategic costs imposed on a nonparty forced
to disclose nonpublic information about its business.285 While a
few authorities have proposed ignoring these costs in establish-
278. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
279. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
280. Cf. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (treating the burden on the nonresident de-
fendant as the decisive factor in the reasonableness analysis).
281. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (citing cases that have
considered the degree of burden on a nonparty witness when determining the
level of due process protection for nonparty witnesses).
282. See Wasserman, supra note 111, at 99-100.
283. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that courts dis-
agree over the wisdom of taking nonparty status into account in determining
the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction).
285. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (summarizing the bur-
dens of nonparty discovery).
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ing a due process standard,286 a proper "fair play and substan-
tial justice" test would consider all burdens the requested dis-.. 287
covery imposes on nonparties, as nonparties. This approach
not only comports with the Supreme Court's understanding of
the burden on a defendant in Asahi, which appears to blend the
burdens posed by distance with more qualitative concerns,288
but properly reflects the lower stake a nonparty witness has in
the lawsuit.
289
b. The Interest of the Parties, the Forum State,
and the Interstate Judicial System
Against the burden on a nonparty witness, courts should
weigh the interests of the parties, the forum state, and the
interstate judicial system.29 These factors should include
several considerations unique to the discovery process: the ex-
pected value of the requested information to the pending
lawsuit, the lack of alternative sources of the same information,
any efficiency to be gained through discovery in the forum
state, and any special responsibility the nonparty witness may
owe to the system ofjustice. 9' Again, these considerations could
cut in favor of or against jurisdiction, depending on the circum-
stances .92
Admittedly, these factors do not translate neatly from the
present reasonableness test for defendants. With regard to
286. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the competing
approaches by courts on the subject); see also Wasserman, supra note 111, at
96 (proposing that the assertion of subpoena power should rest on an analysis
of whether the incremental burdens suffered render the power unreasonable).
287. Cf. supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (arguing that nonparty
witnesses should not receive a weaker standard of due process protection than
defendants).
288. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (describing the
Court's concern in Asahi not only with the cost of traversing the distance be-
tween Japan and California, but also with the burdens inherent in submitting
a legal dispute to the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal).
289. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text. Insofar as a central
component of the due process standard demands "clear notice that [a defen-
dant] is subject to suit" to enable it to consciously "alleviate the risk of burden-
some litigation," World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980), nonparties' relative lack of notice and relative inability to avoid becom-
ing entangled in other people's lawsuits should affect the constitutionality of
jurisdiction.
290. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
291. See First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir.
1998).
292. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
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defendants, for example, the forum state's interest turns in
large part on whether the plaintiff resides in the forum. 293 A fo-
rum state's interest in the testimony or documents of a non-
party, on the other hand, relates to the truth-seeking function
of discovery, and does not depend on the residence of the wit-
ness. 29 4 Also, in cases where one forum obtains discovery on be-
half of litigation pending in another jurisdiction, the forum is-
suing the subpoena has no interest of its own, save perhaps
interstate comity.
295
Still, given that the "fair play and substantial justice"
prong has, from the outset, considered case-specific equitable
factors, courts should have little trouble adapting their analysis
to reflect the interest of parties and courts in discovery from
nonparties. The test for defendants already considers the
shared interest of the interstate judicial system, along with
substantive policy concerns,296 and as a result provides consid-
erable latitude.297 The proposed shift in emphasis would make
the minimum contacts framework more workable when consid-
ering challenges by nonparty witnesses.
CONCLUSION
Whatever the precise contours of the constitutional stan-
dard, the Due Process Clause imposes a personal jurisdiction
limit on nonparty discovery. The minimum contacts test pro-
vides the proper framework for evaluating personal jurisdiction
challenges brought by nonparty witnesses. Courts should, how-
ever, rethink the operation of four aspects of the minimum con-
tacts analysis in the context of nonparty discovery: specific ju-
risdiction, unilateral activity, transient jurisdiction, and the
"fair play and substantial justice" prong. By seriously wrestling
with the correct due process limits on the territorial scope of
the subpoena power, federal and state courts can introduce
clarity and consistency to the haphazard range of approaches
that has dogged the intersection of personal jurisdiction and
nonparty discovery for decades.
293. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
295. See Wasserman, supra note 111, at 81.
296. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
297. See Wasserman, supra note 111, at 94 (noting that "it is axiomatic
that citizens have a duty to testify in both civil and criminal trials," and that
"[clitizens owe this duty not to the individual litigants, but to the system of
justice").

